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RESPONSE TO ROBERT E. KEETON AND
GARY T. SCHWARTZ
Andrew L. Kaufman

I want to begin by thanking Bob Clifford for his interest in tort
scholarship and for his annual sponsorship of this conference on tort
law. I am honored to have been invited into this den of torts scholars
and I should begin my response to Bob Keeton and Gary Schwartz by
expressing my gratitude to them for their thoughtful comments.
My major response to Bob Keeton is to apologize for my lack of
clarity. What I meant to emphasize in my shorter version of some of
the themes of my book is that by and large Cardozo's listeners and
readers have not really understood the relation between the messages
contained in The Nature of the Judicial Process. They have heard the
messages as major and minor, and that may well be part of the reason
why Cardozo has been pictured as a much more progressive judge
than I think he really was. I have no quarrel with Bob's view that for
Cardozo and, I might add, for Keeton, the law-making function and
the restraints on that function are coordinate and complementary.
But the coordination is complex. Judges lie along a spectrum in their
tilt toward more involvement in lawmaking at one end and more deference to the restraints at the other. Cardozo is not easy to place on
that spectrum, and I am sure that all of us here differ somewhat in
where we would place him.
I think that Gary Schwartz and I are in general agreement about
Cardozo's approach to tort law. The one thing I would emphasize
more is that Cardozo's approach in particular cases was influenced
greatly by the confidence his experience as a lawyer had given him in
forming a vision of the facts of a case. My sense is that very often that
vision determined the outcome of the case.
Gary sees Adams v. Bullock' as an illuminating case, and his comments make it so. I plead guilty to slighting that opinion. My only
defense is the size of my book. One of the problems of writing a legal
biography is that the author has to slight almost every case to some
extent. But if I had read Gary's analysis before I turned in my manu1. 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919).
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script, Adams v. Bullock would have played a larger role in the torts
chapter.
Gary does comment on the fact that Cardozo in his Adams opinion
(and he might have added "and in other opinions as well") does not
comment on the nature and purpose of the objectives of negligence
law-deterrence or corrective justice. I suspect that with his eclectic,
accommodationist views, Cardozo would have answered: "both, depending on the particular circumstances." But I would have been surprised if Cardozo had addressed that question in any given opinion.
He was just one of seven judges on the court. His job was to decide
large numbers of cases on a busy court by writing opinions that his
colleagues would join. Writing ambitiously to discuss the large themes
of tort law would have taken a good deal of time and could have lost
votes. Cardozo wrote quickly and then moved on to the next case,
rarely writing a concurring or dissenting opinion in which he might
have explored his own views more freely. When he was convinced to
write ambitiously, it was about the larger issues of being a judge. He
never thought to be a doctrinal scholar in any field.
Gary spends most of his Comment on MacPhersonv. Buick Motor
Co. 2 and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad3 giving the former a
"thumbs up" and the latter a "thumbs down." I agree with those conclusions, although in the case of Palsgraffor rather different reasons.
As for MacPherson, I am uncertain about the warranty issue that
Gary raises because of the doubt whether recovery could have been
had in New York for personal injuries arising out of a breach of warranty at that time. The issue is dealt with, too briefly, at page 649 note
4
31 of my book.
As to Palsgraf,I do not understand why Gary in his teaching does
"not look forward to the day on which Palsgrafis the agenda."'5 His
discussion of that case makes it clear that his students must leave with
a greater understanding of what the judicial function is all about, the
different approaches that good judges might take, the controversial
nature of those different approaches, and indeed how good judges
may have gone wrong. I have talked about Cardozo's doctrinal approach in that case enough in my book, but there is one point I want
to pursue. Gary follows Bill Powers in criticizing Cardozo for failing
to address the issue whether his theory for excluding liability for negligence to an unforeseeable plaintiff should also exclude liability for un2. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
3. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
4. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 649 n.31 (1998).

5. Gary T. Schwartz, Cardozo As Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 305, 313 (1999).
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foreseeable injury to a foreseeable plaintiff. 6 It is true that Cardozo,
following a prior New York case, Ehrgott v. Mayor,7 was willing to
assume, without deciding, that liability would follow in the latter case.
While critical of many things Cardozo did in deciding Palsgraf,I am
not critical of his decision not to revisit Ehrgott in this case. In private
correspondence with Bill Powers, I have speculated that Cardozo himself might have written something like the following paragraph in response to the criticism:
On my view of the case, there is an issue in the law of liability for
negligence that arises before the issue of causation. The question is
whether the defendant and its employees who were helping a passenger on a train owed any duty of care to someone standing far
away. The answer to that, in my view, and I might add, in the view
of most of the wise people then working on the Restatement of
Torts, is that they did not owe a duty unless their lack of care posed
some foreseeable danger to people like Mrs. Palsgraf. It did not in
this case. I found it helpful to segment the issues of negligence into
discrete pieces, and so I did not have to face the large issue that so
troubled my Brother Andrews. Whether Ehrgott was correctly decided or not, it was not necessarily inconsistent and we did not have
to address that issue. We decided enough in Palsgraf. As for foreseeability, I think it important in deciding negligence liability issues,
but I don't think it is the only consideration, and my opinions have
so indicated. I don't think there is any formula for saying when it is
conclusive and when it is not. My opinions in Ultramaresand Moch
make it clear that I believe that one limiting principle is that without
some very good reason we should not extend negligence liability in
indeterminate amounts to an indeterminate number of people.
Other opinions show that legislative action can also be a limiting
principle. And there are doubtless many more. I am flattered that
so many distinguished people seem to be spending so much time on
the opinions in this little case and have spun so many theories out of
and about it. All I was trying to do was to decide one case that was
before us and straighten out one little aspect in New York law in
accordance with the direction in which my Torts masters seemed to
be going.
My major criticism of Palsgrafis different from Gary's. Where I
think Cardozo went off the track was in reversing the jury on the facts
of foreseeability. He did that in other cases too, and that habit I think
derived from his experience as a litigator. Palsgrafis a bit idiosyncratic on one point. If it had not been for the American Law Institute
discussions, my guess is that he would simply have reversed in a more
ordinary Cardozo opinion that confined itself more closely to the
6. William Powers, Jr., Thaumatrope, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1320, 1329-31 (1999).
7. 96 N.Y. 264 (1884).
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facts. I think he tried to "Make Some Law" or at least to provide a
case to hang a Restatement section on. Palsgrafis the wrong case for
judging Cardozo's contributions to tort law, but Gary is right about its
symbolic place in the first-year curriculum. His exposition helps to
explain that place. Palsgrafgives creative torts teachers like Bob Keeton and Gary Schwartz so much to talk about.

